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The attachment of a nation to its ancestral homeland is indisputable. Yet, when 
the nation does not have a clear idea of the geographical parameters of its territory, the 
boundaries often get defined by others and through war.  In the case of Israel, however, 
especially since 1967, the Jewish homeland has been defined and shaped not simply by 
war but by government policies that support the Settlement Project in the occupied 
territories of the West Bank.  While Jewish men and women historically have had 
different roles in defining Israel‘s boundaries—men as defenders of borders and women 
as enablers and reproducers of the nation -- it is Jewish men who have been perceived as 
central to the Zionist Project, not women.  But as this article suggests, such perspective is 
simplistic, for women, especially settlers, as leaders and always as willing practitioners in 
the Settlement Projects, have helped shape the geographical and, more importantly, the 
psychological parameters of the homeland. With each attempt to settle all parts of the 
West Bank, even in the most remote outposts, and refusing to compromise over what the 
homeland includes, these settlers have challenged the memory of a ―Smaller Israel‖ in 
favor of a ―Greater Israel.‖ In their actions therefore, they have been at the forefront of 
the struggle over the memory of boundary and, thus, are challenging the boundary of 
memory. 
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Introduction 
In the years since Israel gained statehood in 1948, significant resources have been 
directed at combating real and imagined existential threats from both Arab States and 
sub-state actors. These threats and the security-minded policies enacted by the Israeli 
government, along with the forces of globalization and Israel‘s policies regarding 
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, have shaped Israeli society politically, 
economically, socially, and psychologically. The prioritization of security concerns and 
right-wing Zionist ideology has led to a further erosion of the already challenged Israeli 
social justice system and has negatively affected the relationships between the sexes, 
ethno-national groups (Jews and Palestinians
1
), socio-economic classes, and ethnic 
groups (European Jews and Jews from the Arab world).  
The dialectical relationship between security and democracy, on the one hand, 
and security and nationalist Jewish ideology, on the other, has produced serious tensions 
among Jews and between Jews and Palestinians in Israel. In essence, these conflicts are 
intimately connected with national identity, and they have focused on boundaries, the 
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homeland, and above all on collective memory. As the focus of these conflicts changes so 
does national identity and so too do its agents and its representations. Changes in national 
identity have brought about shifts in gender identity, and these shifts reflect the 
relationship of gender to nation, security, and boundaries. Because gender identity is 
inseparable from national identity (see Mayer, 2000a; Yuval-Davis, 1997; Yuval-Davis & 
Anthias, 1989), in this article I examine the connection of Israel‘s nation and borders to 
Israel‘s democracy and to gender. My contention is that, although the national project of 
Zionism—defining and defending the Jewish homeland—began as a masculinist and 
secular project aimed at solving the predicament of European Jews,
2
 in recent years 
women, primarily religious women, settlers in the West Bank and until 2005 in Gaza 
have contributed greatly to the core mission of Zionism. Their efforts and those of their 
male counterparts to settle the Palestinian occupied territories and in so doing to 
articulate ―Greater Israel‖ as the homeland, have deepened the schisms within Israeli 
Jewish society and pushed Jewish nationalism to the political and religious right.  At the 
same time, for the majority in Israel, the Settlement Project erased the memory of 
―Smaller Israel‘s‖ boundary and created a new memory, thus challenging the boundary of 
Jewish collective memory in Israel.  
 
Nation and Boundaries 
During the 1,900 years of the Diaspora away from the Holy Land, Jews kept alive 
the connection between the Jewish nation and its homeland. Yet, the specific 
geographical boundaries of this homeland were never clearly defined, even by Zionism‘s 
early ideologues (Mayer, 2007).  Neither the massive Zionist immigration to historic 
Palestine, which began before the First World War, nor the active Zionist agenda 
precipitated discussion of the homeland‘s exact extent.  None knew the specific 
parameters of the Jewish homeland: Did it extend from the Jordan River to the 
Mediterranean Sea? Did it include the Negev to the south and the Galilee to the north? If 
so, how far north and south did the Jewish homeland reach?  This lack of clarity 
continued even after statehood, although by that point there were some markers on the 
ground and on maps associated with the homeland. As Yiftachel and Kedar (2000) argue, 
the 1948 War of Independence enabled Israel to take over land and houses belonging to 
Palestinians. Indeed, in the first few years after statehood, most of the new immigrant 
settlements were built on these lands (Yiftachel & Kedar, 2000, p.43).  Such 
appropriation in favor of one ethno-national group helped expand the idea of the 
homeland for the Jews in both theory and practice.  
The new map that emerged after statehood in 1948 included a large part of 
Mandatory Palestine; territory was far greater and more defensible than was promised to 
the Jewish State in 1947 by the UN Partition Plan (Map 1 & Map 2).
3
 According to the 
1949 Armistice Agreement, these boundaries, known as the Green Line for the color in 
which they were marked on maps, were not supposed to represent political borders but, 
rather, demarcation lines between Israel and its Arab neighbors at the end of Israel‘s War 
of Independence in 1948. The Armistice Agreement lines were contested by the Arab 
world and never sanctioned by the international community. Yet, they were marked in 
textbooks and atlases, and were used regularly by politicians and the media in Israel and 
abroad. They became Israel‘s de facto borders, within which the new state struggled to 
survive and a collective memory about the size and shape of the homeland developed. 
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This collective consciousness etched the Green Line in the minds of most Israeli Jews as 
the one and only border—the border that Israeli male soldiers were called to defend 
between 1949 and the Six Day War of 1967. Each attack on Israeli communities within 
the Green Line further reinforced in Israeli Jewish consciousness that the Green Line was 




At the conclusion of the Six-Day War in 1967, fought against Arab neighbors 
who Israeli Jews believed threatened their state‘s very existence, Israel had quadrupled its 
size by seizing the Golan Heights (from Syria), the West Bank (from Jordan), and Gaza 
and the Sinai Peninsula (from Egypt) (See Map 3). The Green Line became irrelevant for 
a significant part of the Israeli population; beginning in the early 1970s it ceased to 
appear on maps produced in Israel, and by the end of that decade young Israelis and new 
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immigrants had little or no idea where the Green Line once was, or what it represented 
(Fleischmann & Salomon, 2005). As the collective memory of a ―Small Israel‖ became 
the domain of the past and the now-expanded borders constructed a new collective 




However in May 2006, to the dismay of Israel‘s religious and right-wing parties 
the Minister of Education, Yuli Tamir, argued that the Green Line should be restored on 
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maps and in textbooks. Tamir asked how a real discussion with the Palestinians about 
Israel‘s borders could take place if the West Bank appeared on all maps to be inseparable 
from Israel. Tamir understood that the collective memory associated with these maps and 
with the Settlement Project has had a dialectical relationship with reality, and that a 
change in the maps could lead to a more nuanced reality. In other words, re-drawing the 
Green Line on all Israel‘s maps would challenge the perception that the West Bank as 
Judea and Samaria is part of Israel and, therefore, would reflect more accurately the 
complex political and social realities of the region.  
Debates about the state‘s and the nation‘s 4  boundaries have been central 
throughout Israel‘s history. In a newspaper interview only a few weeks before the 1967 
war, when Israel‘s legendary first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion was asked what he 
would tell his grandson if one day he were to ask where the boundaries of his homeland 
lay. Ben-Gurion replied that his answer today would be, ―the boundaries of your 
homeland are the boundaries of the state of Israel as they are today, that‘s it‖ (Maariv, 
May 12, 1967, quoted in Feige, 2002, p.30, emphasis added). The ambiguity of his 
answer underscores the ambiguity of the borders of the state and the homeland. He might 
have meant that the 1949–1967 borders were indeed the boundaries both of the state and 
of the national homeland (and within these boundaries Israel had already successfully 
appropriated its homeland, as Feige 2002 argues). Or, he might have meant that these 
boundaries were not static and that, if he were asked another day, perhaps several weeks 
later, the answer might be different: That the homeland is where the expanded state is. 
And indeed, just a few weeks later the boundaries of the state did expand, and many 
Jewish men and women in Israel began to believe that the boundaries of the Jewish 
national homeland had expanded as well. Yet the goals for Israel‘s 1967 war did not 
include expansion as a way to free the homeland (Segev, 2001). Rather, the aim was to 
provide Israel with maximum security. Only later would ideas about the fit between the 
state and the homeland play a role in establishing Israel‘s boundaries. 
Immediately after the 1967 War, Israel faced an internal struggle over the 
definition and significance of the newly drawn borders and territories within them. 
Should it withdraw from, or should it annex the areas occupied in the war? Should it keep 
the territories as a bargaining chip and a security zone? The discussion was influenced by 
a group of rabbis who claimed that the newly occupied territories, particularly the West 
Bank and Gaza, were an integral part of their homeland, their ―promised‖ land. Calling 
upon their followers to settle these lands, they gave birth to the Settlers‘ Movement, Gush 
Emunim (in Hebrew, ‗Block of Believers‘). Both men and women settlers, chiefly young 
religious couples, made YESHA (the Hebrew for Judea, Samaria, and Gaza) their home, 
but they played different roles: as we will see, women members of the Settlers‘ 
Movement were central to its success. They actively fought to create a memory of a new 
boundary, which now included the Palestinians Occupied Territories, and then to 
preserve that memory.  This process was informed by their deep conviction that the 
occupied Palestinian lands belonged to the Jewish people alone.  
Although its wars should have unified the Jewish nation, they did not. The 
borders created in 1967 and the new territories within them further deepened the divide 
within Israeli society and within the Jewish nation in Israel. While these boundaries 
distinguished Israel from its neighbors, they also distinguished between Jewishness and 
Israeliness, the land and the state (Gurevitz & Aran, 1991), place and placelessness, 
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secular Jews and religious Jews, and ultimately between left-wing and right-wing. They 
also distinguished between women on both sides of the Green Line---between those who 
have had the power to change reality in the West Bank and Israel‘s politics and those who 
have not. Suddenly, areas that had not been considered places belonging to Jews were 
accepted and even naturalized as Jewish places, and ―Greater Israel‖ became the object of 
yearning and a site for pilgrimage for segments of the Jewish population (Gurevitz & 
Aran, 1991, p.34). The Settlement Project, as reflected in the settlers‘ enthusiasm and 
commitment to the land, had a messianic fervor. Yet the effect was to split Israeli Jewish 
society between settlers and non-settlers, between the ―New Zionists‖ and the original 
Zionists.  
The debates within Israel about the future of the occupied territories have been 
about much more than lines on a map. They have been about the shape and character of 
both the state of Israel and the Jewish nation, and in large part about the collective 
memory of what Israel was, what it is, and where it ought to be. In many ways, the 
struggle has been over the essence and the shape of Israeli democracy. Both Jewish men 
and women have participated actively in these debates and struggles, but they have 
carried out the tasks of shaping the map and the collective memory differently. While 
men traditionally have shaped the map through their active participation in wars, women, 
especially women settlers, have shaped the new map both by their leadership positions 
among the settlers and the defiance they have exhibited when Israeli soldiers set out to 
dismantle their outposts. Moreover, although the issue of territorial withdrawals has 
consumed the Israeli public, the debate has been conducted within only one part of that 
public. Left out of the discussion have been the Israeli Palestinians,
5
 who comprise more 
than 20% of Israeli citizens and who will be affected directly by the shape of the state. 
Discussion of the future of the boundaries of Israel and the war on collective memory is 
for Jews only, and this restriction further deepens the already existing divide between 
Israel‘s Jewish and Palestinian citizens. 
 
Democracy: A hierarchy that privileges only some 
While the geographical parameters of the homeland in historic Palestine were 
never clearly defined, the European ideologues of the Zionist movement were very clear 
that their new state would be Jewish and democratic. In the spirit of British democracy, 
they established a social democracy (Schweid, 1995), one whose Declaration of 
Independence (in lieu of a constitution) would guarantee that there would be no 
discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or religion. Thus, Palestinian citizens of the 
state (at that time referred to as Israeli Arabs) were to enjoy the same rights as Jews: 
freedom of expression, of the press, and of political organization, for example. Yet even 
though the media is relatively open and the Basic Laws of Israel provide certain citizen 
rights, the Palestinian citizens of Israel do not enjoy the same rights and privileges as 
Jews and are second-class citizens.  
The idea behind the creation of a Jewish state was the establishment of a nation 
state, although more than one nation would live within its boundaries.
6
 A characteristic of 
a bi- or multi-national state is that the dominant group has more political and economic 
power and invariably has control in these areas. In the case of Israel, which was founded 
with European Jewry in mind, the Palestinian citizens of the land have not had equal 
access to political, economic and social power. And as Yossi Yonah (2005) suggests, 
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neither have the Jews who came from the Arab world: ―The national collective … does 
not permit a full and equal inclusion of secondary groups, who are perceived by the 
collective as integral to it‖ (p.30). Thus, the divisions within Israeli society are manifold: 
between Jews and Arabs, between European and Arab Jews
7
, and between secular and 
Orthodox Jews. And, there is a further divide within each of the groups—between men 
and women. The result in Israel has been that Palestinians as a group, Arab Jews, women, 
and Orthodox Jews have been excluded from the collective.  
Even though discrimination against minorities is prohibited by law, Israeli 
governments have found ways around this restriction. Projects and policies that aimed to 
distribute Israel‘s population spatially, as a way to offset a possible Arab majority in 
certain areas of the country, have been used as an official tool to favor effectively Jews 
over Palestinian citizens.
8
 Certain laws, such as the Law of Return which deals with the 
return of Jews to their homeland, have further privileged the Jewish population. Such 
institutions as the Jewish National Fund (JNF) and the Jewish Agency, both of which 
were central in the pre-state years, have continued their missions. The JNF, for example, 
whose original goal was to acquire lands of the homeland for the Jewish nation, continues 
to control large portions of the public lands of Israel. Soon after statehood, the new Israeli 
government sold to the JNF land that had previously belonged to the Arabs of Palestine, 
now refugees. Immediately after the 1948 War, the government deemed these lands 
―abandoned property‖ (Benvenisti, 2007), and they became Israel‘s national lands. 
Today, the JNF holds about 13 percent of Israel‘s public lands (Blau, 2011). Although it 
periodically sells portions of it to citizens, it maintains its practice of selling only to 
Jews.
9
 Thus the JNF, an extra-parliamentary body, has enabled the Israeli government to 
practice discriminatory Judaization policies (Yiftachel, 2007, p.118) and further its 
―ethnocracy‖ (Yiftachel, 2006).  
Because Israeli democracy is an ethno-republican democracy (Peled, 2006; 
Yonah, 2005) and because the dominant discourse since Israel‘s birth has been of 
national security, those who have contributed most to Israel‘s security have been the 
favored sons of the nation both directly and indirectly (Levy, 2007). This group consisted 
almost exclusively of Jews of European origins, whose families were members of Labor 
Zionism, and who were integral to what Peled and Shafir (2005) call the National 
Colonial Project of settling the homeland and establishing a nation-state.  Settling the 
land required a high degree of militarism, which formed the ethos of Israel for 
generations to come (Ben Eliezer, 1995).  Those Jews who have contributed least to 
Israel‘s security—women, Arab Jews, and religious (Orthodox) Jews—have been 
marginalized.
 
Veterans of the Israel Defense Force (IDF) have enjoyed advantages in 
employment and educational opportunities as well as special economic benefits. Male 
veterans, because they serve longer and historically have reached higher ranks in the IDF 
than women, are considerably more advantaged. Officers obtain key positions in the 
public sector, academia and the business world, even if they have little experience in such 
organizations. In the eyes of the Israeli public and its leadership, the IDF is an effective 
incubator for nurturing national leaders, and neither Jewish women nor Israeli 
Palestinians can compete. 
In recent years the once excluded groups, particularly Arab Jews (Mizrahim) and 
religious youth, have entered the military in larger numbers. Some Jewish religious 
women and a few Israeli Palestinians either serve in the IDF or opt for a term of ―national 
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service‖ and thus enjoy more rights. The importance of the IDF in Israel‘s life is 
declining however, and it no longer provides the same social cachet it once did. Despite 
these changes, Israel has become an even more deeply divided society. The current gaps 
between rich and poor, Israeli Palestinians and Jews, and secular and orthodox Jews have 
no parallel in Israel‘s history.10 As long as Israel continues to privilege certain groups and 
to favor the security discourse over the socio-economic, the gaps will deepen further, 
leading to what Yiftachel calls ―hierarchy of ‗separate and unequal citizenships‘‖ (2007, 
p.122).  
 
Gender: Privileging gun and womb 
Although Yiftachel (2007) did not consider Jewish women in his hierarchy of 
―separate and unequal citizenships,‖ it is important to include them when we discuss 
nation, boundaries and democracy, precisely because it is through the interface of these 
categories, and specifically between nation and boundaries, that the position of Jewish 
women in Israeli society is defined. Discrimination against women in Israel is more 
marked than in the average Western country (Peled, 2006, p.34). As Israel attempts to 
define its national boundaries, both internally and internationally, men and women are 
relegated to specific tasks and positions. They are remunerated according to the 
contributions that each group makes to the State and to the Jewish nation. Most favored 
are Jewish men, especially those of European origin (Levy, 2007), who are involved in 
the ―real work‖ of defense (Mayer, 2000b; Izraeli, 1994).  The social hierarchy in Jewish 
Israel, though, is based not simply on gender and what each contributes to nation-
building, but it is based on ethnicity as well as gender. Israeli-European Jewish women, 
who are positioned higher on the socio-economic ladder, have greater access to economic 
and political power than Arab Jewish women. 
Israeli women‘s fight for economic, political and social equality has encountered 
serious difficulties. The hypermasculine ethos of the state, heavily influenced by both 
military concerns and the Jewish religion, has yielded a potent form of patriarchy. A 
woman‘s contribution to Israeli society is measured by her role as a mother: the more 
children she produces, the more valued she is. This attitude is not new; it dates back to 
early Zionist ideology.
11
 It was perfected after statehood, however, and promoted by the 
state  (Berkovitch, 1997) through its pro-natalist policies. Women have undoubtedly been 
an integral part of the Israeli economy, both in pre-state years (Bernstein, 1987) and after, 
but in most cases they have been relegated to service jobs near their homes. Women had 
won the right to vote before statehood (Swirsky, 1993; Azaryahu, 1977), and they were 
able to vote and run for office in the newly established state. But, Jewish women in Israel 
remain marginalized in economic, military, religious and social arenas. Despite the 
images of equality – for example, tanned women in uniform holding guns -- that appear 
often in advertisement and pictures of Israel abroad, women‘s equality in Israel is little 
more than an illusion (Swirski & Safir, 1993). 
Women are conscripted into the IDF, but they do not fight; they carry guns, but 
do not shoot them. Their contribution to Israel‘s national security is primarily through 
their service jobs in the IDF and their roles as mothers. In order to ensure a Jewish 
majority, to offset a relative increase in the Israeli Palestinian population, Jewish women 
are encouraged to reproduce. For many years, Israel presented an annual ―Mother of the 
Year‖ award, for which women who had a dozen or more children could be nominated. 
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Invariably, women who won had fifteen to eighteen children and were Arab Jews or, 
more recently, ultra-Orthodox Jewish women. The award was given in a public 
ceremony, often in the presence of politicians and always covered in the daily press.
12
 
The message was clear: We, in Israel, reward Jewish women, especially those from the 
lower socioeconomic classes and from religious backgrounds, not for their ability to 
produce but rather their ability to reproduce. 
Despite these inducements, the fertility rate among Jewish women, except for 
Orthodox women, has declined. Yet, the demographic war between Israeli Jews and 
Palestinian Arabs, the Womb War, has intensified, and Jewish women‘s demographic 
contribution has become more important. Since the late 1980s, Israel‘s government has 
designated public money to assist both married and unmarried women citizens of the 
state to realize their ―dream‖ of motherhood (Berkovitch, 1999), which it assumes is the 
goal of all women. It has made in vitro fertilization (IVF), artificial insemination, and 
surrogate motherhood available for all women in Israel.
13
 Under Israel‘s National Health 
Care Plan, these and other medical procedures that lead to healthy pregnancies and 
motherhood are covered by health insurance, a further indication of the importance of 
motherhood to the Jewish nation. Despite the high price tag associated with these 
procedures, there has been critical debate neither about the wisdom of spending the 
largest share of the public health budget on reproductive aid nor about the ramifications 
of such population policy for women. 
This emphasis on motherhood, or on the potential for motherhood, has been 
supported by the religious establishment. Religious parties have held a central position in 
Israeli politics since the late 1940s and historically have wielded a great deal of power.
14
 
They have been able to propose and pass laws that have resulted in women‘s 
marginalization in Israeli society. For example, women, except for doctors and nurses, 
are prohibited from holding night jobs; married women are exempt from being 
conscripted and thus limited in their possible contribution to national security. Women in 
the IDF have always been relegated to roles that neither endanger them nor threaten their 
ability to be mothers, although in the last few years, as a result of a decline in young 
secular Israeli males joining elite units and a modest increase in women‘s demand for 
equal access, more military opportunities have opened up for women.
15
 Nevertheless, 
with very few exceptions, women are not found on the battlefield or among the support 
troops near the front lines. 
Although women cannot expect to have military careers and or benefits similar to 
those of men, their contribution to national security, beyond their roles as reproducers, 
has been significant, in large part because in Israel there is no clear distinction between 
civilian and military life (Kimmerling, 1993). There are many reasons for this blurred 
distinction. Since its establishment, the IDF has been charged with a number of civilian 
tasks such as education and immigration absorption; because of Israel‘s small size, no 
military base or border is far from any home; and Israelis have historically had an 
intimate involvement with the IDF and with war. Indeed, Israel has been escribed as a 
society in uniform (Ben Eliezer, 1995; Kimmerling, 1993). Almost all Israeli women 
participate, often uncritically, in the state‘s military efforts. They send their sons and 
husbands to war, wash and iron their uniforms, and remain behind to maintain the home 
front. They are expected to accept their role as ―natural‖; if they question that role or 
refuse to carry it out, they are accused of weakening national security. It is precisely 
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because of women‘s roles that men in Israel are free to carry out their military duties. As 
enablers, women are participants in the military, including the colonial processes in 
which Israel has engaged in the last several decades.  
A growing number of women do not accept or support Israeli policies, however. 
In the last two and a half decades, hundreds of Israeli women have been actively involved 
in protest movements that have challenged government policies regarding militarism, 
security, and the occupation. Women in Black,
16
 Mothers against Silence, End the 
Occupation, Four Mothers,
17
 and most recently Shuvi
18
 have all created discursive spaces 
in which motherhood has been politicized and from which women, and sometimes men, 
challeng the discourse of national security. There have been other similar protest 
movements, but these five groups are unique in that they were all started by women, four 
of them by mothers, who capitalized on the importance of motherhood in Israeli society 
and used it to plead for political change. Palestinian women citizens of Israel have joined 
Women in Black and, through their connection with Jewish women protestors, have 
gained a platform from which to demonstrate against Israel‘s continuous occupation of 
the West Bank and Gaza (until the 2005 withdrawal). In practice, these protest spaces are 
women‘s spaces, and the intense harassment that these women have endured, primarily 
from Jewish men, indicates they have challenged not only Israel‘s military policies but 
also Jewish men‘s masculinity. 
We should not assume, however, that Jewish women are a homogeneous group. 
On the contrary, they reflect the divisions within Israeli Jewish society, based on 
ethnicity, class, and degree of religiosity.  Jewish women of European descent have fared 
better than those whose origins are in the Arab world. Arab Jewish women (Mizrahi) are 
more traditional, less educated, and in the past have had large families. For the most part, 
they have not been represented in these protest movements in the same way as Jewish 
women of European origin have, and in general they seem to be less critical of Israel‘s 
policies regarding the West Bank and Gaza. Orthodox women, especially those who 
follow nationalist Zionism, also have not been critical of Israel‘s policies, and it is these 
two groups of women that are found in the settlements of the West Bank (and of Gaza 
until the Israeli withdrawal in 2005). Yet while Orthodox women of European descent are 
found in larger numbers in the more ideological settlement, the Mizrahi settlers are over-
represented in the less ideological settlements. Their move to the occupied territories 
perhaps was motivated more by economic concerns than by religious ideology. The 
reasons do not matter, however. Settlers, among them women, who opposed every cause 
of the women‘s protest movements (e.g., Women in Black, Mothers Against Silence, 
Four Women), have helped redraw Israel‘s boundaries simply by moving to and settling 
in the West Bank.  Thus, women on both sides of the Green Line have been important in 
the struggle to shape Israel‘s border. Women protestors aspire to a smaller Israel and the 
settlers to a greater one.  
 
Women and the Memory of Boundary  
Women, the social and biological reproducers of every nation, are also the 
protectors of its purity (Mayer, 2004; Yuval-Davis, 1997).  Jewish women in Israel, 
especially settler women, have played an additional role; they have actively participated 
in marking and preserving the boundary of the nation, both physically and 
psychologically. As we have seen, religious women have been the backbone of the 
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settlers‘ movement, and, alongside their men as the ―New Zionists,‖ they have built 
dozens of settlements on land that was confiscated from Palestinian Arabs.
19
 These 
women‘s task has not been much different, however, from that of the Jewish women 
pioneers who settled historic Palestine in the early part of the twentieth century. Indeed, 
one of the major aims of Zionism, then and now, has been settling the homeland. But 
these two groups of women differ in ideology. The original Zionist mission was wholly 
secular and nationalist. The mission of the current settlers is anchored in religious 
ideology and texts; they believe these lands are the Biblical lands given by God to the 
Jews. For ―New Zionist‖ women, nationalism and religion are one. There are differences 
in education as well; the current women settlers are better educated than the early 
pioneers (El-Or, 1994). Like many modern women, they are politicized, benefiting from 
feminism in ways that early women pioneers could not. In some cases, education has won 
for them leadership positions in their communities and in the Settlers‘ Movement, and 
thus they have become an important voice in the new nationalist Zionism that has 
developed in Israel since the 1967 war. 
The structure and location of many settlements also play a role in women‘s 
contribution to the movement and in the question of which places are or are not to be 
included within the state boundaries. Some settlements and outposts are geographically 
remote (Map 4), and others are not large enough to provide employment opportunities. 
To obtain work, male settlers have had to commute to Israel or to the larger towns in the 
West Bank, leaving their wives behind to care for their families, their homes, and 
ultimately the home front. In these Jewish islands amidst a Palestinian sea, the women 
keep their communities alive by providing support and services to one another. In the 








Journal of International Women‘s Studies Vol 13 #4 September 2012 
  
Men‘s daily commute has meant that the settlements in the West Bank have 
become almost exclusively women-only spaces during the day, and settler women have 
challenged what in the West are seen as differentiated public and private spheres. For the 
most part, a distinction between the two spheres cannot exist in the Jewish West Bank. 
Living on the front line, the women use traditionally private spaces and activities—
cooking in the kitchen, or nursing in the living room—to study, socialize, support one 
another, and discuss their reactions to government policy. In these spaces they become 
further politicized, and many are ready to take action. Some have become involved in 
Mothers for Israel (Feige, 2002) and Women in Green (or Women for Israel‘s 
Tomorrow),
20
 taking active roles in shaping both the physical and psychological 
attachment to ―Greater Israel.‖  
Although the Settlement Project has been a joint effort by both men and women, 
the women have not always followed their men. Beit Hadassah
21
 in Hebron was occupied 
in 1979 by ten religious women and forty of their children, all of whom were already 
settlers in Hebron (Feige, 2002, p.153). They defied the Israeli army, snuck into the 
building, and resided there for at least a year in physically harsh conditions before the 
Israeli government, led by the right-wing Likud Party, agreed to declare Beit Hadassa a 
genuine settlement. The Rechelim outpost was occupied by women settlers in 1991 after 
the murder of Rachel Drouk, a settler who had been killed a day or two earlier (El-Or & 
Aran, 1995). They held a vigil on the site, and, although the Israeli military and civil 
administrations initially opposed them, they later gave their support (El-Or & Aran, 
1995). The Rechelim project
22
 was discussed by the political leadership of the Settlers‘ 
Movement the night before the move but the next day, when about two dozen women, 
many of whom were members of Mothers for Israel (Feige, 2002, p.151), occupied the 
site, it appeared to be a spontaneous action. Hundreds of religious women from 
settlements throughout the West Bank and from communities throughout Israel supported 
them; some briefly joined their vigil and others stayed longer.  Men, too, visited 
Rechelim, bringing water and food and lending support. Rabbis came and offered Torah 
lessons. But the Rechelim settlement remained, at least for a while, a women‘s project. 
Reversing gender roles, women stayed at the site day and night, leaving their husbands to 
care for their homes and families (El-Or & Aran, 1995). Later however, the women went 
home at night, leaving their husbands and sons to guard the settlement (El-Or & Aran, 
1995, p.62). Although they initially defied their traditional roles by spearheading these 
settlements, in the end these women reverted to the familiar position of allowing men to 
be the protectors of settlements, women, and children.  
The actions of the women of Beit Hadassah and Rechelim, like those of 
thousands other settlers, had two primary goals. The first was to redraw Israel‘s map by 
appropriating another nation‘s land, which they believed was wholly justified; the 
second was to reshape Israeli Jewish culture, history, memory, and psyche. The 
settlement sites were not chosen at random. Rather, in an effort to connect the present to 
the past and the past to the future, the settlers selected sites anchored in deep memory 
and history: places mentioned in the Bible, areas in which there was a Jewish presence 
until they were lost in the 1948 war (Map 1 & Map 2), or where Jewish settlers had been 
killed by Palestinians within the last two decades. Each of these sites has become in 
itself a monument, testimony to the rich Jewish history in this land. In other words, they 
have become what Pierre Nora (1989) calls Les Lieux de Mémoire, sites of memory.  
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The more textured and nuanced these sites become and the more that settlers are 
committed to them, the deeper they are etched in the minds of settlers and their allies in 
Israel, and the more unmarked ―Greater Israel‖ becomes. These sites, then, do two 
things; they recall the past and create a memory of a new boundary, and at the same 
time they erase the memory of the older boundary.  Because remembering is inseparable 
from forgetting (Egoz, 2008; Legg, 2007; Hoelscher & Alderman, 2004), the settlers 
actively shape the memory of boundary and challenge the boundary of memory. 
The settlers are not a monolithic group; their ideological commitment varies 
both by the age of the settlement, the number of years that individual settlers have lived 
there, and by gender. Those living in the older settlements, known as the ideological 
settlements, show a stronger commitment. But as Billig and Sauerkraut (2006) show, 
gender is perhaps a more important variable in determining commitment to remaining in 
place. Women, they argue, are more likely to stay in their settlements than men, 
especially as the threats from Palestinians increase (p.682). The longer women reside in 
a settlement, the stronger their ideological commitment, their sense of place and their 
willingness to stay in their communities despite Palestinian attacks. Their commitment 
to the land overcomes both fear for themselves and risk to their families (Billig & 
Sauerkraut, 2006).
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 Men also tend to want to stay in their settlements if they feel a deep 
attachment to place, but unlike women they are more inclined to leave if they perceive 
the Palestinian threat to be imminent (Billig & Sauerkraut, 2006, p.682). The gender 
differences perhaps can be explained by the mutual support that women give one 
another and by their experiences in the women-only spaces—experiences that men lack. 
But the men interviewed by Billig and Sauerkraut also see it as a result of ―women 
[being] stronger‖… and ―stronger in their belief‖ (2006, 686). 
It is unquestionable that over the last thirty-seven years both women and men 
have contributed to the physical marking of the landscape. Their goal has been not 
merely settling the Biblical lands, but also recreating and molding Israel‘s collective 
memory, erasing the Green Line, and ultimately redrawing the map of Israel. Their 
struggle has been both physical and psychological. For a number of reasons, it appears 
that women settlers have been more central than men to the psychological dimension. 
Perhaps they are more articulate. Perhaps they photograph better, in tears as they 
confront soldiers who have come to evacuate them, or when as mothers with children in 
tow they passionately explain their commitment to the land. Or, perhaps it is because 
they are the only ones home when reporters come to interview, especially after a 
terrorist attack. Whatever the reason, women have appeared more dominant in the 
struggle over Israel‘s memory of boundary.  
Memory is always changing; it is heavily influenced by the dialectic of 
remembering and forgetting. Thus, it has been crucial for the settlers to be as vocal as 
possible, and to use the most effective methods to shape Israel‘s collective memory. 
During the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in August 2005, for example, as the collision 
between the state and the settlers came to a head, the settlers fought hard to keep their 
settlements. The media broadcast every part of the struggle and played an important role 
in the war over memory. Determined and strong in their religious conviction, the settlers 
refused to leave their homes and their synagogues, and when forced to withdraw they did 
so fighting. Reports of the evacuees losing their homes, their communities and their own 
histories, coupled with footage of crying and screaming women forced to leave their 
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God-given land by none other than Jewish soldiers, were powerful elements in the 
psychological war of the settlers.  
Perhaps the psychological war over collective memory and the shape of the nation 
would not have been as successful had it not been for the fact that some variables of this 
conflict were rather familiar. They echoed elements of myths that have been cemented in 
Jewish memory, myths in which a Jew faces a more powerful Other—a Goliath—or the 
few face the many. This binary relationship has been the most important building stone of 
Jewish nationalism since its inception. The violent confrontation in Gaza, which was 
broadcast to the world, was between a young woman who represented what she saw as 
the ultimate truth and an officer in uniform who represented the power of the state; 
between a religious Jew holding a Torah scroll and soldiers who escorted him, sometimes 
pushed him, out of the synagogue; between the few and the many; between idealists who 
held one truth and those who obeyed orders and held another (Asheri, 2005). Rabbis 
compared the removal from Gaza and some later outposts in the West Bank to the 
expulsion of the Jews from Spain as well as to the destruction of the First Temple and 
especially the Second Temple by the Romans (Shragai, 2006), evoking the familiar 
themes which in the past have constructed the Jewish collective memory. These themes 
and the pictures shown on television found a sympathetic audience throughout Israel, 
even though the Israeli public was divided about whether or not to disengage unilaterally 
from Gaza. Even those who supported disengagement were affected by the personal and 
communal stories, and the replaying of themes from the past helped the settlers in 
moving Israeli consciousness to the right and reshaping Jewish collective memory. In the 
war on the memory of boundary, the settlers, particularly women settlers with the help of 
the media, played a crucial role.  
With close to half a million Jewish settlers now residing in the West Bank and 
over 200,000 in East Jerusalem, the Settlement Project has been a success in the eyes of 
Israel‘s government and more than half of Israel‘s Jewish population.  They see the West 
Bank as part of the territorial contiguity of Israel. Indeed, maps of Israel in textbooks, 
newspapers, advertisements and even the weather map shown on Israeli television, for 
example, support and reinforce this perspective.  The West Bank is Judea and Samaria, 
and this is Israel.  The New Zionists (i.e., the settlers), and particularly the women, have 
been central to this accomplishment.  As mothers, wives and leaders in the Settlers‘ 
Movement, women settlers have exhibited a physical and psychological resilience 
reserved only to those who are motivated by the deepest conviction.  Without these 
women, or if they had played a lesser role, it is not clear that the Settlement Project 
would have been as successful and the struggle for the memory of boundary so potent. 
 
Conclusion 
One of the most important characteristics of a nation is its attachment to a 
territory it calls home (Smith, 1981, Connor, 1978). The Jewish nation is no different, 
but, unlike many other nations, the exact parameters of the Jewish homeland have never 
been defined clearly. As we have seen, this lack of unambiguous boundaries has posed 
major challenges to Israel‘s democracy and to the internal structure of its society: 
privileging one nation, one gender and one ethnic group (Jews from Europe). While in 
the first part of the twentieth century the international community had defined what 
would and would not be included in the future Jewish State (Mayer, 2008), this ceased to 
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be the case in 1948 after Israel won its independence and doubled in size. For more than 
sixty-four years the boundaries of the state have been articulated from within, through 
policies enacted by Israel‘s governments, sometimes in defiance of international 
agreements and always with the help of soldiers, settlers and/or willing citizens. The lack 
of clear boundaries of the state and the homeland has also been the cause of many of 
Israel‘s external struggles and wars as well as why security, one of Zionism‘s long-time 
goals, continues to define life in Israel. 
In a society that has worshiped the IDF and its soldiers, women have nonetheless 
played important roles. As mothers, they have been drafted to fight the demographic war 
between Israel and the Palestinians within Israel and its occupied territories. As wives, 
partners and mothers, they have maintained the home front and supported their 
servicemen, enabling the IDF to maintain the physical boundaries between Us and 
Them— that is, between Jews and Palestinians, Israel and its neighboring Arab states. 
Although many in Israel may argue that women have not contributed to changes in 
boundaries, we have seen that is hardly the case. Women have been the backbone of the 
Project as its leaders and always as its willing practitioners. 
With the erasure of the Green Line after the 1967 war, ideas of where the 
homeland lay began to correspond for some Israelis, especially religious Jews and those 
who are right of the political center, to the expanded new boundaries. The new Settlers‘ 
Movement translated their love for these lands into action. When the right-wing Likud 
party came to power, the government supported the efforts of hundreds of thousands of 
Israeli Jews to make these territories their home, using religious ideology to justify 
settling on Palestinian lands. As Jewish nationalism has moved to the right, attachment to 
the lands of the West Bank as part of the historical Jewish homeland, has deepened. The 
ambiguity about the exact location of the homeland played into the hands of various 
Israeli governments and the Settlers‘ Movement. Since 1977, the government has 
capitalized on the settlers‘ movement‘s intense commitment to the Biblical homeland. At 
the same time, the settlers have benefited from the government‘s commitment to Greater 
Israel, which translated into major subsidies both for the development of infrastructure in 
the West Bank and for the settlers themselves.  
Religious Zionist women have been important in this intersection. As we have 
seen, they sometimes initiated new settlement projects through acts of defiance, as in the 
cases of Beit Hadassah and Rechelim. But they have carried out many more of Zionism‘s 
tasks. They have maintained the home and the front, created strong and thriving 
communities, and helped fight the demographic war by reproducing in large numbers, 
even larger than Arab Jewish women.
24
 Perhaps more than any other group in Israel in 
the last sixty-four years, ―New Zionist‖ women settlers have challenged the distinction 
between the private and public spheres. Each woman is both a private and a public 
person, representing herself, her family, her community, and the settlers as a whole.  
Their contribution to border-marking has been even greater. By settling in the 
West Bank and Gaza, women expanded Israel‘s border. By taking a central role in 
protesting the disengagement from Gaza in the summer of 2005, they expanded and 
maintained both the physical and the psychological border, even if for only a limited 
period of time. Through their sometime violent protest, they endeavored to etch the West 
Bank and Gaza into memory of Greater Israel, into the idea of the homeland. They have 
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fought for the memory of boundary, and they have expanded the boundary of memory, 
both of which are complicated tasks in the dynamic politics of the Middle East.  
Much like the Green Line, Greater Israel itself is on its way to becoming a relic of 
the past. The controversial new Separation Wall erected at the edge of settlements in the 
West Bank, purportedly a temporary measure against terrorism, is quickly becoming the 
new de facto border. It has already changed the map of Israel, marking which Jewish 
settlements will remain part of the state and which will not, while at the same time further 
constricting the size of the future Palestinian state. It also marks the beginning of yet 
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1
 The Arabs of historic Palestine who remained in Israel after its independence in 1948 
now refer to themselves as Palestinian citizens of Israel or Israeli Palestinians (sometimes 
hyphenated and often not).  Ethnically and nationally they are part of the Palestinian 
nation that was dispersed from Palestine to neighboring countries as a result of Israel‘s 
1948 War of Independence.  While the Palestinians of Israel hold Israeli citizenship, 
Palestinians who live in the West Bank and Gaza do not.  They hold no citizenship 
because they are considered refugees and, hence, citizens of no sate. 
2
 Zionism, the Jewish national movement, sought to bring about the social, political, 
economic, psychological, and geographical transformation of the European Jew, who was 
excluded from the different national liberation movements of Europe of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As such, this was a revolutionary and utopian 
movement. 
3
 United Nation General Assembly Resolution 181 (passed on November 29, 1947) 
divided historic Palestine into two states: one for the Jews and one for the Arabs. Each of 
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these states was comprised of three distinct but not geographically contiguous sections.  
Jews were pragmatic and endorsed the plan and the Arabs, who feared the loss of much 
of their lands, did not.   
4
  While a state is a political unit, a subdivision of the globe, a nation is a group of people 
whose members share ethnic origins, language, religion and customs, who believe in a 
common past and hope for a shared destiny. What distinguishes a nation from an ethnic 
group is an attachment to an ancestral territorial homeland, for which members of the 
nation have political aspirations. 
5
 See footnote 1. 
6
 There are no pure nation-states anywhere in the world; with more than 3000 nations in 
the world and slightly over 190 states, all states are either bi- or multi-national states. 
7
 I use the term Arab Jews to refer to Jews who came to Israel from the Arab world.  
They are sometimes referred to as Mizrachim (Easterners or Oriental), or Sepharadim.  In 
the Israeli social hierarchy, where European Jews are at the top, Arab Jews have been for 
many years at the bottom with Palestinian Israelis not too far below them.   
8
 Two such programs have been the Population Distribution Policy (of the 1950s and 
1960s) and the Judaising the Galilee Project (of the 1980s and 1990s).  Both these 
programs aimed at ensuring a regional Jewish majority within Israel.  This was 
particularly pertinent in the Galilee, for example, where by the early 1980s Israeli 
Palestinians constituted more than 50% of the population. 
9
 The JNF practice was recently challenged in court; Israel‘s High Court ruled in favor of 
the Israeli Palestinians plaintiffs, but the practice of selling State lands only to Jews 
continues. 
10
 In economic terms, Israel now ranks only slightly behind Mexico and the US with the 
highest rate of income inequality per household in the world (OECD, 2011). These have 
social, political, and psychological ramifications. 
11
 Theodor Herzl, the father of Zionism, defined very clear gender roles in his vision of 
the Jewish state: men would produce and women reproduce. Unmarried women would 
care for orphans  (Herzl, 1956). 
12
 The ―Mother of the Year‖ Award competition continues in many municipalities in 
Israel, particularly in those with a large population of Arab Jews.  It is no longer a 
national competition.  The award is now given not only for raising a large number of 
children but for doing so while contributing to the community. 
13
 The commitment to a large population in Jewish Israel despite the already high birth 
rates, has made Israel the world leader in the number of IVF procedures (Kraft, 2011).  
Further, because Israel provides and fully pays for unlimited IVF procedures per woman, 
up to two ―take-home babies‖ and until the age of 45, the use of reproductive 
technologies has been the largest public health expenditure in Israel (Kraft, 2011).   
14
 Because neither the Labor nor the Likud party has ever attained a clear majority, 
religious parties have always been needed for government coalition, and thus they have 
been able to pass legislation and demand amendments that fit more traditional values.  
Few things are as dear to religious parties as the status of Jewish women in Israel. In fact, 
these parties have stood in the way of legislation that would guarantee equality for 
women since the first coalition government in the early 1950s. They traditionally have 
been concerned with preserving and protecting the institutions of the family and marriage. 
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Most personal matters (certainly those regarding marriage and divorce) have been in the 
hands of religious courts, which also tend to disfavor women.  
15
 The 1949 Security Service Law was amended in 2000, dramatically increasing the type 
and number of military jobs for which women could volunteer. By 2003, the length of 




 Women in Black is an anti-war organization formed after the first Intifadah began in 
December of 1987. The women, who have demonstrated weekly for more than twenty 
years, protest Israel‘s occupation of the West Bank (and until 2005 of Gaza) as well as 
the serious violations of Palestinian human rights by Israeli soldiers  
17
 Four Mothers, a grassroots organization begun in 1997 by mothers of soldiers (later 
joined by men), was one of the more effective protest movements in Israel‘s history. It 
exerted tremendous pressure on Israel‘s government for a unilateral withdrawal from 
south Lebanon, which Israel occupied from 1982 until it finally withdrew in April 2000. 
18
 Shuvi, another grassroots organization, was founded by women to pressure Israel‘s 
government to disengage from Gaza. Once it was clear that the disengagement plans were 
in place, members of Shuvi turned their attention to the physical and psychological well-
being of the soldiers participating in the disengagement from Gaza. This movement did 
not change the social structure but accepted it and worked within it. 
19
 In the more than forty years since the Settlements Project began, close to 200,000 Jews 
made East Jerusalem their home and another 500,000 Jews settled in the West Bank 
effectively displacing more than 160,000 Palestinians (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2011, 
p.78).  The number of the displaced varies greatly depending on who does the reporting. 
Israeli sources claim 150,000 Palestinians have been displaced, and Palestinian sources 
claim over 400,000 (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2011, p.75). Regardless, the majority 
of the displaced are children and grandchildren of those originally displaced from historic 
Palestine in 1948. 
20
 Women in Green, also known as Women for Israel's Tomorrow, is a right-wing 
political women's group whose members wear green hats to show their opposition to 
Women in Black. The group opposes any negotiations with Palestinians and any 
exchange of land for peace, and they aggressively support Israeli settlements in the West 
Bank and until 2005 in Gaza. They also opposed the withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. 
21
 Beit Hadassah, located in close proximity to the Cave of the Patriarch, was occupied by 
Jews until a massive Arab attack in 1929. A few families returned, only to flee again 
during the 1936 Arab Revolt, and for many years the building either stood empty or was 
used by UNWRA. When Israel conquered the West Bank and Jews settled Hebron, there 
was no government support to reclaim Beit Hadassah. Even Menachem Begin, whose 
West Bank expansionist ideology was well crafted, did not endorse the settlers in Beit 
Hadassah for more than a year. 
22
 The name Rechelim (plural for Rachel) was a way to honor two women named Rachel 
who were killed in terrorist attacks---Rachel Druck and Rachel Weiss---and the Biblical 
matriarch, Rachel. 
23
 Billig and Sauerkraut‘s research appeared at about the same time as that of Avital 
Laufer (2006), who studied the relationship between exposure to terrorism and 
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ideological commitment among young adults who were politically inclined to the right, to 
the center, and to the left. She found that the most ideologically committed were the 
young adults who were most exposed to terrorist acts and that their commitment rose 
with the number of terrorists attacks they experienced.  
24
 The settler population is growing twice as fast as the Jewish population in ―Smaller 
Israel,‖ and in 2006 was almost 5.5% annually (Shragai, 2007). 
